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Faced with a sequence of N binary events, such as coin flips (or Ising spins), it is natural to ask
whether these events reflect some underlying dynamic signals or are just random. Plausible models
for the dynamics of hidden biases lead to surprisingly high probabilities of misidentifying random
sequences as biased. In particular, this probability decays as N−1/4, so that no reasonable amount of
data would be sufficient to induce the concept of a fair coin with high probability. I suggest that these
theoretical results may be relevant to understanding experiments on the apparent misperception of
random sequences by human observers.
There is a large literature testifying to the errors that
humans make in reasoning about probability [1, 2]. Per-
haps most fundamental is the claim that people routinely
detect order and hidden causes in genuinely random se-
quences [3]. These apparent limitations on human ratio-
nality have broad implications, not least for economics,
and have attracted considerable attention in the popu-
lar press. In contrast with these results, a number of
experiments indicate that humans and other animals can
change their behavior in response to changes in the prob-
abilities of stimuli and rewards, sometimes making opti-
mal use of the available data [4, 5, 6, 7]. Similarly, many
perceptual discriminations approach the limits to relia-
bility set by noise near the sensory input [8, 9, 10], and
related ideas of statistical optimization have emerged in
recent work on motor control [11, 12, 13]. There is even
the suggestion that if the detection of order vs. random-
ness is cast in the standard two–alternative format for
perceptual discrimination experiments, then people can
learn to perform with close to the statistically maximum
reliability [14]. While nearly perfect neural processing of
statistical data under some conditions could coexist with
qualitative failures at similar problems under different
conditions, it would be attractive to have a more unified
view of the brain as an engine for probabilistic inference.
The problem of identifying genuinely random se-
quences has a number of subtleties that seem not to have
been emphasized in the previous literature. In particu-
lar, from a Bayesian point of view our confidence that a
given sequence really was generated at random depends
entirely on the universe of alternative models that we are
willing to consider. Here I consider a family of models
that involve time–dependent biases of unknown magni-
tude, similar in spirit to the models that would allow op-
timal inference under the conditions of the experiments
in Refs [6, 7], and show that an observer who tries to
understand the world using these models will exhibit a
surprisingly large probability of misidentifying random
sequences as having small but nonzero biases. Most im-
portantly this probability declines only as a fractional
power of the sequence length, so that (for example) no
reasonable human experience with the flipping of a coin
would provide sufficient evidence to induce the concept
of fairness with high probability.
To be concrete let us consider data in the form of bi-
nary sequences—coin flips (heads/tails), for example, or
a sequence of rewards/nonrewards from a particular class
of actions. Let the observations come in a sequence la-
beled by n = 1, 2, · · · , N , and let the binary variable on
each observation n be denoted by σn. If the process is
described by a fair coin then all sequences occur with
equal probability,
P ({σn}|fair coin) = 1
2N
. (1)
The problem faced by the observer, however, is to es-
timate the probability that this particular sequence was
generated by a fair coin, that is P (fair coin|{σn}). Bayes’
rule tells us that we can write this probability as
P (fair coin|{σn}) = P ({σn}|fair coin)P (fair coin)
P ({σn}) , (2)
where P (fair coin) measures the a priori probability of a
fair coin and P ({σn}) measures the probability that this
particular sequence will arise, averaged over all possible
models that might describe it; schematically we can write
P ({σn}) =
∑
all models
P ({σn}|model)P (model), (3)
and of course one of the possible models is the fair coin.
Because the fair coin generates all sequences with equal
probability [Eq (1)], the probability that a fair coin gen-
erated a given sequence depends on the details of the se-
quence only through the term P ({σn}), i.e. only through
the average over all possible models of the sequence.
Thus our confidence that our experience is described by a
fair coin depends entirely on the set of alternative models
that we think is appropriate to the situation.
A plausible set of alternatives to the fair coin is that
each σn responds independently to a bias, but this bias
may change over time. To specify this class of models
completely requires at least three steps. First we need to
describe the bias on each trial. To treat heads and tails
2symmetrically we can represent heads/tails as an Ising
spin σn = ±1, and measure the bias on observation n as
an effective magnetic field hn such that [15]
P (σn|hn) = exp(−hnσn)
2 cosh(hn)
. (4)
Assuming that the bias acts on each observation inde-
pendently, we have
P ({σn}|{hn}) =
N∏
n=1
exp(hnσn)
2 cosh(hn)
=
1
2N
e−f({σn;hn})(5)
f({σn;hn}) =
N∑
n=1
[ln cosh(hn) + hnσn] . (6)
A particular set of biases {hn} constitutes one possible
model. The second step is that to average over models
we will need a hypothesis about the distribution of these
biases. Consider the case where the bias is on average
zero (coins or circumstances that favor heads are as likely
as those that favor tails), and where the presumably small
fluctuations in bias are drawn from a Gaussian with root–
mean–square fluctuations hrms. Dynamics of the bias
vs. time are described by a correlation function C(τ),
〈hnhm〉 = h2rmsC(n −m). If, for example, the bias tends
to stay constant for runs of 10 observations, then C(τ)
should be close to 1 for |τ | ≤ 10 and fall to zero for
|τ | ≫ 10. It is convenient to the think about a matrix Cˆ
with elements defined by (Cˆ)nm = C(n −m). Then the
full distribution of biases has the form
P ({hn}|hrms) = 1
Z
exp
[
− 1
2h2rms
N∑
n,m=1
hn(Cˆ
−1)nmhm
]
,
Z = (
√
2pihrms)
N exp
[
+
1
2
Tr ln Cˆ
]
. (7)
As a third and final step we have to specify our knowledge
of C and hrms. To keep things simple let us assume that
there is something about the situation which makes us
certain about the time scales on which bias can vary, so
that we know the correlation function C(τ), but we don’t
know for sure how strong the biases can get, so we have
to average over some distribution P (hrms).
Putting the various terms together, we can write the
probability of observing a sequence {σn} in the broad
family of biased models as
P ({σn}|biased)
=
∫
dhrmsd
Nhi P ({σn}|{hn})P ({hn}|hrms)P (hrms),
(8)
and then
P ({σn}) = P ({σn}|fair coin)P (fair coin)
+P ({σn}|biased)P (biased). (9)
Thus the probability of an observed sequence arising from
a fair coin is
P (fair coin|{σn}) = 1
1 + exp(Λ− µ) , (10)
where the log–likelihood ratio is
Λ = ln[P ({σn}|biased)/P ({σn}|fair coin)], (11)
and the threshold µ = ln[P (fair coin)/P (biased)].
In the limit that hrms is small we can compute the
integral over {hn} in Eq (8) as a perturbation series. To
fourth order in hrms, the result is∫
dNhi P ({σn}|{hn})P ({hn}|hrms)
=
1
2N
exp
[
−Nτc
2
ah4rms +
√
Nτczh
2
rms
]
, (12)
where the correlation time is defined by
τc =
1
2N
Tr Cˆ2 =
1
2
∑
n
C2(n), (13)
a = 1 + y
√
4g/Nτc, g = (Tr Cˆ
4)/(Tr Cˆ2), and the vari-
ables z and y depend on the particular sequence that we
observe:
z =
1√
4Nτc
[∑
nm
σnCˆnmσm −N
]
(14)
y =
1√
4gNτc
[∑
nm
σn(Cˆ
2)nmσm − Tr Cˆ2
]
.
(15)
The normalization of z and y is chosen so that they each
have zero mean and unit variance if the {σn} actually are
generated by a fair coin. The exponential in Eq (12) sets
a scale for hrms ∼ N−1/4, which becomes small at large
N . Thus when we do the integral over hrms in Eq (8) it
will be dominated by very small values of hrms, so the
relevant parameter is P (hrms → 0) = ρ [16]. Then
P ({σn}|biased)
=
ρ
2N
∫
dhrms exp
[
−Nτc
2
ah4rms +
√
Nτczh
2
rms
]
. (16)
At large N and z < 0 the integral is dominated by its
behavior near hrms = 0, while for z > 0 it is dominated
by a saddle point at h∗ = (z
2/a2Nτc)
1/4. When the dust
settles, the large N approximation to the log–likelihood
ratio becomes
Λ(z < 0) ∼ 1
4
ln
[
pi2ρ4
4z2Nτc
]
(17)
Λ(z > 0) ∼ z
2
2a
+
1
4
ln
[
pi2ρ4
4z2Nτc
]
, (18)
3where the dependence on the observed sequence is
through the value of z (and, negligibly in this limit, also
through the dependence of a on y).
From Eq (10) we see that if Λ > µ then the probabil-
ity of the sequence {σn} being described by a fair coin
is less than half. Equivalently, if Λ > µ then the data
are more likely to be described by a biased model. If we
want to make correct assignments with highest probabil-
ity, then the correct decision rule is maximum likelihood
[4], so that all sequences with Λ > µ should be labeled
as biased. Obviously there is some probability that this
condition is met even if the sequence in fact was gener-
ated at random. Note that for large N the variable z,
which determines Λ, is the sum of many terms which are
independent if the sequence really is random. Thus the
distribution of z approaches a Gaussian (with zero mean
and unit variance, by construction) and we can estimate
the probability that Λ > µ, which is the probability that
a random sequence will be identified as biased [17].
The condition Λ > µ corresponds either to z− < z < 0
or z > z+, where
z− = −pi
2
(
ρ
P (fair coin)
P (biased)
)2
1√
Nτc
(19)
z+ = ln
1/2
[
2z+
√
Nτc
piρ2
(
P (fair coin)
P (biased)
)2]
(20)
Then a sequence generated by a fair coin will be assigned
as biased with a probability given by
Perror ≈
∫ 0
−z
−
dz√
2pi
e−z
2/2 +
∫ ∞
z+
dz√
2pi
e−z
2/2. (21)
For large N , |z−| ≪ 1 and z+ ≫ 1, which lets us approx-
imate the integrals to find
Perror ∼ r2
√
pi
8Nτc
+
r
2
· 1
(Nτc)1/4
· 1
ln5/8
[
2
√
Nτc/pir2
] ,
(22)
where r = ρP (biased)/P (fair coin) and I neglect terms
of the form ln lnN . At sufficiently large N the second
term dominates, and we have simply
Perror ∼
(
Nc
N
)1/4
· 1
ln5/8
[√
N/(4pi2Nc)
] , (23)
where the scale is set by Nc = r
4/(16τc).
The power–law decay of the error probability is surpris-
ing if we have in mind the conventional problem of sta-
tistical hypothesis testing. With two specific alternative
hypotheses, e.g. the fair coin and a coin with fixed (and
known) bias, the log–likelihood ratio on average grows
linearly with the number of examples that we observe,
this growth rate being the Kullback–Leibler divergence
between the two hypothesized distributions, and the re-
sulting error probability falls exponentially. By allow-
ing for the possibility that biases change with time over
the course of our observations—which seems plausible in
many natural contexts—we construct a family of models
with a number of parameters that grows as the size of
the data set increases. In addition, the particular model
of bias considered here allows larger data sets to be used
to test for weaker biases (smaller hrms), which again is
plausible but very different from the simpler problem of
discriminating between two fixed distributions. To sum-
marize, if we test data for a fixed bias of known size, then
the probability of mistakenly finding order in a random
sequence decays exponentially. If on the other hand we
test for time dependent biases of unknown magnitude,
the error probability falls as a power–law. The case con-
sidered here generates a 1/4 power, but one can construct
models that generate other powers as well [16].
In the case of two specific hypotheses, the exponen-
tial dependence of error probability also means that the
trading between number of examples and prior proba-
bility is only logarithmic. Suppose that when fair and
biased coins are equally likely a priori (µ = 0), it takes
N0 examples to reach some criterion level of error. If we
now imagine that truly fair coins are rare, in the con-
ventional hypothesis testing view it will take ∆N0 ∝
ln[P (biased)/P (fair coin)] additional examples to reach
the same level of error. In contrast, when we search for
time dependent biases with unknown magnitude, we are
much more sensitive to prior probabilities, since Eq (23)
predicts N0 ∝ Nc, or N0 → N0[P (biased)/P (fair coin)]4.
Concretely, if we can expect that genuinely random se-
quences constitute only ∼ 10% of the events that we will
see, that the typical scale of biases is hrms ∼ 1 so that
ρ ∼ 1, and that correlation times are τc ∼ 10 events, then
Nc ∼ 40 and hence even at N = 104 the error probability
is Perror ∼ 0.25 [18].
The sequences which are identified as biased are pri-
marily those with large positive values of z from Eq (14).
If the expected correlation function of the bias is every-
where positive (so that we don’t expect oscillating bi-
ases), then this singles out sequences that have an excess
of runs with multiple heads or tails in a row. Put another
way, sequences which are declared to be random have
fewer runs than expected in genuinely random distribu-
tions. This is in agreement with experiments showing
that when human subjects are asked to generate random
sequences or to assess sequences for randomness, they be-
have according to a “representativeness heuristic” [19] or
as if there were a “law of small numbers” [20] according to
which short sequences are more typical of long sequence
mean behavior than actually predicted for a fair coin.
All of the analysis done here can be repeated in a model
where “bias” is replaced with serial correlation. Then
the natural parameter is not a local magnetic field but a
local exchange interaction Jn between neighboring spins
σn and σn−1. The analog of z [Eq (14)] which controls
the likelihood of a sequence being assigned as random or
4correlated is played by
z′ =
1√
4Nτc
[∑
nm
(σnσn+1)Cˆnm(σmσm+1)−N
]
, (24)
where Cˆ is now the correlation matrix and τc is the cor-
relation time for fluctuations in J . Again the sequences
identified as biased will be those with large positive z′,
corresponding to an excess of either repetitions or alter-
nations. This may provide an even more accurate de-
scription of human perceptual biases toward representa-
tiveness in small samples [2, 19].
The model of dynamic biases considered here is closely
related to the experiments in Refs [6] and [7], where ani-
mals experience time dependent biases in reward proba-
bility and have to modulate their behaviors accordingly.
In these experiments the possibility of a fair coin is ex-
cluded by construction, so the question is not to deter-
mine whether the bias exists but rather to determine its
current value and use this value in decision making [21].
Within the model above one can show that, for weak bi-
ases, the optimal estimate is hˆn =
∑
i≥0K(i)σn−i, where
the kernel K is determined by
∑
m
CˆnmK(m− j) + 1
h2rms
K(n− j) = Cˆnj (25)
Specifically, if C(τ) = exp(−|τ |/τc), then the kernel is
also exponential, K(τ) ∝ exp(−τ/τint), where the in-
tegration time is τint = τc/
√
1 + 2h2rmsτc. Thus, when
correlation times are long, even if hrms is not too large
the optimal estimator integrates for a time much shorter
than the correlation time—e.g., with correlation times
over order 100 events, τint ∼ 10 − 15 events, in reason-
able agreement with the results of Ref [7].
In the framework considered here, the failure to rec-
ognize genuinely random sequences arises not as a lim-
itation but rather as an inevitable consequence of the
optimal search for weak dynamic biases. Important tests
of this idea thus include generalizations of the experi-
ments in Refs [6, 7] that allow detailed comparisons of
human strategies for bias estimation with the optimal
strategy, especially the prediction that the optimal strat-
egy shifts with the context defined by the distribution
out of which the fluctuating biases are drawn. Although
not a complete theory, it seems plausible that the ob-
jective difficulty in inducing the concept of a truly fair
coin found here could be related to other problems in
reasoning about probability that usually are ascribed to
subjective factors.
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